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Abstract 
 
This study examines the link between the board independence and asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings in a bank-oriented financial system. The models by Basu (1997) and Ball & 
Shivakumar (2005) are re-estimated. This study extends prior research by Beekes et al. (2004), 
Ahmed & Duellman (2007) and Garcia Lara et al. (2007) and investigates the relationship 
between board compositions and asymmetric timeliness of earnings in civil law regime and 
capital markets, which are commonly considered more bank than market based. Such 
institutional settings exist among others, in Finland, Japan, Germany and Scandinavia.  
The Finnish data serves well for this study because accounting quality in Finland is considered to 
be among the highest in the world. The estimation period 2003-2005 serves well for this study, 
because the renewed and highly detailed corporate governance recommendation for Finnish 
listed companies entered into force in December 2003.  
The results obtained using the Basu model show that bad news (negative returns) are reflected in 
earnings on a more timely basis than good news (positive returns). In this respect the results are 
in line with earlier findings. Unexpectedly it was found that timeliness of bad news reporting 
does not depend on the number of independent directors, while the timeliness of good news 
reporting does. The result can be interpreted in such a way that independent directors do not 
directly increase the market reaction to good news (positive returns) but have an indirect effect 
by increasing the markets` credence in the board and their reporting. The results from the Ball & 
Shivakumar model indicate that, inconsistently with the Basu model, timely recognition of bad 
news (negative cash flows) over good news (positive cash flows) is statistically insignificant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Asymmetric timeliness, Bank Oriented Financial System, Board Independence, 
Corporate Governance, Earnings conservatism.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the link between board independence and asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings in a bank oriented financial system. Bank orientation refers to the Finnish financial sys-
tem in the 2000`s, where the banks` financial role is very important1. However, the restructuring 
process of the Finnish financial markets during the 90´s caused the banks to concentrate on finan-
cial services as their main source of revenue instead of power games for strategic ownerships in 
core companies (Moen & Lilja 2005; Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2007). The relation-
ship (bank-group) based governance system spheres of influence withered away, and the systems of 
finance and governance became separated. Then the need for an investor oriented system of corpo-
rate governance regulation, for example, through board independence became essential. 
 
Board independence refers to the proportion of board members having no relationship with the 
company that would or could be perceived to materially affect their decision-making (Leo et al. 
2007). Since executive directors’ careers are tied to the CEO, the monitoring role of the board is 
predicted to fall mainly on the independent board members. Thus, the role of independent directors 
is essential to the resolution of agency problems between managers and shareholders as well as 
shareholders and creditors (Berle & Means 1932; Coase 1937; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith & 
Warner 1979; Fama & Jensen 1983; Shleifer & Vishny 1997).  
 
Stronger corporate governance, i.e. more independent directors on the board, is expected to result in 
more demand for timely information on earnings. Reported earnings are considered to be timely 
when they accurately reflect the information that has been incorporated by the market in its pricing 
of a firm’s equity. In such cases reported earnings have a direct effect on price movements. This 
paper seeks anomalies with respect to full timeliness. In asymmetric timeliness, earnings are more 
sensitive to bad news (negative returns) than to good news (positive returns). This incremental time-
liness of bad news recognition over good news recognition is at the root of Basu´s concept of earn-
ings conservatism (Basu 1997; Watts 2003a; Bushman & Piotroski 2006).  
 
The timely incorporation of favorable and especially unfavorable information in earnings facilitates 
effective monitoring of managers by the board of directors (Beekes et al. 2004). Moreover, the 
                                                 
1 I thank Professors Michael Bamber (Terry College of Business, University of Georgia) and Petri Sahlström (Department of Ac-
counting and Finance, University of Oulu) for rising up the issue of banks role in Finnish financial system and corporate governance.  
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board is also beneficial for other stakeholders and its duty is not only to monitor managers (The 
Finnish Company Act 6:2§). Acceleration in the recognition of bad news provides the board of di-
rectors with early warning signals to investigate the origin of bad news.  
 
Prior empirical findings from the UK (Beekes et al. 2004), US (Ahmed & Duellman 2007) and 
Spain (Garcia Lara et al. 2007) indicate that firms with a higher proportion of independent board 
members report bad news in a timelier manner than good news. Moreover, international mainstream 
research highlights that conservative earnings reporting is most active in countries with market 
based financial systems and Anglo-Saxon common-law legal structure (e.g. Ball et al. 2000; Giner 
& Rees 2001; Garcia Lara & Mora 2004). In addition, country specific findings e.g. by Raonic et al. 
(2004); Bushman & Piotroski (2006) and Brown et al. (2006) also indicate asymmetrically timely 
recognition of bad news in civil law regime and markets, which are commonly seem to be more 
bank than market based, like Finland, Japan, Germany and Scandinavia.   
 
The motivation of this study is twofold. First, extensive data including all sizes of listed firms from 
Finland are utilized. It is notable that prior empirical findings from Finnish markets (and also many 
other markets) are based on country specific findings from large international machine readable 
databases covering only the largest listed companies. By using hand collected and highly detailed 
data a better concept for separate markets is provided.   
 
Second, corporate governance structure and especially the board of directors may be an important 
cause of asymmetric timeliness of earnings, also in markets like Finland. The globalization of busi-
ness means that nearly all governance regimes share similar pressure for increased transparency and 
accountability. In that sense, conservative earnings reporting could be an effective monitoring tool 
for independent directors, also in civil law regimes and capital markets, which are commonly seem 
to be more bank than market based.  
 
The Finnish data is highly appropriate for this study because the accounting quality in Finland is 
considered to be among the highest in the world2. The data is hand collected and very detailed from 
                                                 
2 For example, based on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Finland were ranked in the top 2 during 2003-2005, indicating almost 
the lowest level of corruption in the world (Transparency International 2004, 2005 and 2006). Moreover, based on the Global Com-
petitiveness Index (GCI) Finland was ranked top in 2003 and 2004 and was second in 2005 (Lopez & al. 2004, 2005 and 2006). It is 
reasonable to assume that the higher the overall level of business ethics, the higher the level of financial reporting quality, either 
because there is an accounting measure contained in the ranking criteria, or because the quality of accounting and business practice is 
highly correlated (Lindahl & Schadewitz 2009).    
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Finnish listed firms during the period 2003-2005. The period 2003-2005 serves very well for this 
study, because the renewed and highly detailed corporate governance recommendation for Finnish 
listed companies entered into force in December 2003. This recommendation sets very specific cri-
teria for evaluating directors` independence (HEX3 et al. 2003; OECD 2004), which is appropriate 
for this study.  
 
Earnings conservatism is measured following Basu (1997) and Ball & Shivakumar (2005). The Ba-
su (1997) model (hereafter Basu model) uses 12-month share returns as proxies for good and bad 
news. Under conservative earnings reporting, earnings have a higher sensitivity to bad news (nega-
tive returns) than to good news (positive returns). The Ball & Shivakumar (2005) model (hereafter 
Ball & Shivakumar model) is purely accounting based, but the intuition behind it is the same as in 
the Basu model: Accounting earnings tend to anticipate the recognition of bad news (negative cash 
flows) and to delay the recognition of good news (positive cash flows). Total accruals and cash 
flows are negatively associated, but this negative association, because of the asymmetric recogni-
tion of news in earnings, tends to be lower in periods with economic losses (Garcia Lara et al. 
2007). 
 
The results obtained using the Basu model show that bad news (negative returns) is reflected in 
earnings on a timelier basis than good news (positive returns). In this respect the results are in line 
with prior findings from Finnish data. Instead, it is unexpectedly found that timeliness of bad news 
reporting does not depend on the number of independent directors, but the timeliness of good news 
reporting does. In fact, the timeliness of good news reporting reaches its maximum when the whole 
board consists of independent directors. However, the result can also be interpreted in such a way 
that independent directors do not directly increase the market reaction to good news (positive re-
turns) but has an indirect effect by increasing the markets` credence in the board and their reporting.  
 
The result using the Ball & Shivakumar model shows that relations with discretionary accruals and 
cash flows are negative as expected, and that the relation is statistically significant. In addition, the 
relation between accruals and negative cash flows (bad news) is positive though statistically insigni-
ficant. Surprisingly, the firms with more independent directors have no direct or indirect reaction to 
negative cash flows (bad news) or positive cash flows (good news) reporting.   
                                                 
3 Nowadays, HEX Plc is NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd.  
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This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, by using the Basu model this 
study confirms prior findings that in Finnish markets the speed of bad news recognition in earnings 
is higher than to good news recognition.  In that sense the findings confirm that Finnish listed firms 
report earnings in a conservative manner. However, results based on the Ball & Shivakumar model 
this relation are not statistically significant. Second, contrary to the findings from the UK, US and 
Spanish markets, in Finnish markets credence in bad news reporting does not depend on board in-
dependence. Both models give support to this. Third, in the Finnish bank oriented financial system 
board independence increases the markets` credence in the board and their good news reporting. 
However, the relation between accruals and positive cash flows did not lend support to this pheno-
menon.  
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 introduces the sample 
and data. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 summarizes the findings and outlines future re-
search ideas.   
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Finnish Corporate Governance in the Agency Theoretical Framework  
2.1.1. Development of the Finnish Financial System and Investor Perspective Governance  
 
In the framework of agency theory the fundamental question of corporate governance is how to 
assure financiers that they get their proportion of return on their financial investments (Berle & 
Means 1932; Coache 1937; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983; Shleifer & Vishny 
1997). This investor perspective system of corporate governance is based on a philosophy of protec-
tion not only of shareholder (particularly minority) rights but also of debt holders` rights in public 
held firms (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Letza 2004; Leo et al. 2007). Traditionally, the investor pers-
pective system of corporate governance has been typical for market-based finance systems in con-
trast to relation based corporate governance in a bank based financial system. In bank based finan-
cial systems firms and banks feel little need to develop corporate governance mechanisms to protect 
investors` rights.  Firms are willing to rely on banks to continue financing their projects and banks 
feel it convenient under explicit or implicit government guarantee.   
 
Until the early 1990s, the bank based finance and relationship based governance system was typical 
for Finnish listed firms (Hyytinen et al. 2003; Moen & Lilja 2005; Liljeblom & Löflund 2006). The 
dominant logic of corporate governance in that financial system was based on long-term invest-
ments in capital intensive production, and it rested on a system of risk sharing between banks, cor-
porations, and the state4. However, many changes took place in the 1990s5. In the late 1990s, equity 
issuance on the stock market by the non-financial firms clearly exceeded that of financial institu-
tions6.  
                                                 
4 The state had a dual role. First, it was the owner of industrial enterprises in several capital intensive industries as well as of banks. 
Second, it had instruments for macroeconomic regulation. As a final resort to restore the competitiveness of Finnish firms, it could 
devalue the currency (Moen & Lilja 2001). When Finland decided to join the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
devaluations were taken out of the arsenal. 
 
5 For example, a banking crisis in the early 1990s led to a drastic reduction in banks’ holdings of corporate equity. Moreover, the full 
opening of the stock market for foreign investors in 1993 quickly led to a rapid increase in foreign holdings from a level less than 10 
% (1993) to a level of about 50 % in 2003 – 2005 (Nordic Central Securities Depository [NCSD] 2008). In addition, the Finnish 
government reduced it equity holdings, only maintaining larger stakes in a handful of listed firms (Moen & Lilja 2005; Liljeblom & 
Löflund 2006).  
 
6 For example, in the period 1995–2000, 55 new Finnish companies were listed on the Helsinki Stock of Exchange (Hyytinen et al. 
2003). 
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Despite the development of Finnish financial markets from being bank-based towards a market 
orientation, the banks` financial role continues to be very important in Finland, also in the 2000´s. 
However, the restructuring process of the financial markets caused the banks to concentrate on fi-
nancial services as their main source of revenue instead of power games for strategic ownerships in 
core companies (Moen & Lilja 2005; Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2007). Because rela-
tionship (bank-group) based governance system spheres of influence withered away, the need for a 
high quality investor perspective system of corporate governance regulation became essential. Es-
pecially, because typical foreign investors on the Finnish market follow Anglo-Saxon investment 
practices, pressures on the quality of governance in Finnish companies are present, for example, 
through board independence.  
 
2.1.2. Framework of Corporate Governance Regulation in Finland 
 
In Finland good corporate governance regulation consists of various factors (Securities Market As-
sociation 2009). There are both legal regulation and recommendations based on self-regulation. The 
legal regulation for Finnish corporate governance is primarily contained in the Finnish Companies 
Act, which is most closely related to the corresponding laws in the Scandinavian countries like 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Liljeblom & Löflund 2006). With respect to corporate governance, 
a central role is played by the annual general meeting (AGM). For example, the AGM typically 
nominates the board who in turn hires and fires the chief executive officer (CEO). Moreover, the 
regulatory body of Finnish corporate governance also includes the Securities Market Act, the Rules 
of the Helsinki Stock Exchange and Finnish Financial Supervision Authority governed by the Bank 
of Finland (Liljeblom & Löflund 2006). The Finnish Corporate Governance Code (CG Code) com-
plements` the legislation and is in the form of ‘Comply or Explain’. This means that firms listed on 
the OMX are bound to follow this code to its full extent, but firms can deviate from the given rec-
ommendation by announcing the deviation with the required explanations7.   
 
The first Finnish CG Code was issued in 1997. However, the growing significance and international 
development of corporate governance practices contributed to amending the recommendations. A 
                                                 
7 The aim of the code is to harmonise the practices of listed firms as well as the information given to shareholders and other inves-
tors. The code will also improve the transparency of administrative bodies, management remuneration and remuneration systems. It 
will also provide an overall picture of the central principles of the corporate governance system of Finnish listed firms and enhance 
the success of Finnish listed firms (Security Market Association 2009).   
 
 
7
very detailed corporate governance code for listed companies was issued in December 2003 (OECD 
2004; Commission of the European Communities 2007; Securities Market Association 2009).  
 
The central features in the Finnish CG Code 2003 are requirements for independent (single) boards, 
support for the establishing of board committees such as audit, nomination and compensation com-
mittees, requirements to report on the organization of internal control, internal audit, and risk man-
agement functions of the firm, and various disclosure requirements. Moreover, firm management 
may not act as members of nomination or compensation committees. The recommendation does not 
approve the same person to be both the board chairman and CEO.  In addition, the recommendation 
takes a negative view of a dual board structure (supervisory boards on top of regular boards) and 
recommends that, if such a board structure is in place, the role of the supervisory board should be 
restricted to be as narrow as possible. Finally, the recommendation states that a majority of the 
board members should be independent of the company, and in addition, at least two board members 
should be independent of the owners of more than 10 % of the equity or votes of the firm.  
 
Although the 2003 recommendation has been seen to work well and to meet high standards interna-
tionally, new regulations alongside EU directives and recommendations created a need to update the 
code in 2008. In relation to board of directors, the new code states that the board will appoint the 
members of committees from among its own members. Moreover, the composition of boards of 
listed companies should include members of both genders, but this recommendation should be im-
plemented only at annual general meetings by 20108.  
 
2.1.3. The Concept of Independent Director in Corporate Governance 
 
The board of directors represents the pinnacle of the decision-making hierarchy and control system 
in larger firms (Fama & Jensen 1983; Beekes & al. 2004). Although all directors on the board have 
equal powers (unless explicitly delegated otherwise by the board) effective boards have to separate 
the problems of decisions management and decisions control. In that sense, business practice and 
regulation refers to different types of directors: executive directors, non executive directors, grey 
directors and independent directors (Leo et al. 2007).  
 
                                                 
8 For a detailed comparison between the 2003 and 2008 codes, see Security Market Association 2009.   
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Executive directors are full-time employees of the firm they govern and most often carry a title that 
signifies this, such as CEO. In contrast, non-executive directors (outside directors) do not work full 
time in the company, but they may hold several positions as executives of other organizations. 
Within the non-executive director classification, there is a subclassification of grey directors and 
independent directors. Grey directors are those who may, at times, experience a conflict of interest 
because of their positions with other organizations (e.g. as the manager of a supplier to the company 
or a partner in a professional services firm that works for the company). Instead, independent direc-
tors have no relationship with the company that would, or could be perceived to, materially affect 
their decision-making (Leo et al. 2007). 
 
From the corporate governance point of view, there is no internationally prescribed form for the 
board members` independence criteria (OECD 2004). However, the subsections from (a) to (i) in 
recommendation 18 in the Finnish CG Code 20039 gives very specific criteria to evaluate a direc-
tor’s independence (HEX Plc et al. 2003).  According to that code, a director is not independent of 
the company if the director  
(a) has an employment relationship with company, or director holds a position in the company;  
(b) has had an employment relationship or position in the company during the last three years 
prior to the inception of the board membership;  
(c) receives from the company - or from a member of its operative management significant 
compensation for services or other advice not connected with the duties of the board, (e.g. 
the director works on consulting assignments for the company);  
(d) belongs to the operative management of another company, and the two companies have a 
customer, supplier or co-operation relationship significant to the other company; or  
(e) belongs to the operative management of another company whose director is a member of the 
operative management in the first company (interlocking control relationship).  
In addition, the board can on the basis of its overall evaluation determine that a director is not inde-
pendent of the company if the director 
(f) participates in a performance-based or share-related compensation system of the company  
(However, the financial significance of the compensation system shall be taken into ac-
count);   
(g) the company is aware of other factors that may compromise the independence of the director 
and he/she is ability to impartially represent all shareholders. 
                                                 
9 In the 2008 updated code, that congruent recommendation is 15.  
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Furthermore, the criteria on which board members are determined not to be independent of signifi-
cant shareholders of the company are given in subsections (h) and (i). Significant shareholder 
means a shareholding at least 10 % of all the shares or of the aggregate votes in the company. The 
code states, that the director is not independent of a significant shareholder of the company if 
(h)  he/she exercises dominant influence in the company such as referred to in the Finnish 
Companies Act, or has a relationship such as earlier referred to in sub-sections (a) and (b) to 
a party who exercises dominant influence in the company, or  
(i)  the director is a significant shareholder him/herself, or he/she has a relationship to a signifi-
cant shareholder of the company such as referred to in sub-sections (a) and (b)10. 
 
Finally recommendation 18 states that in all situations, when evaluating independence, the circums-
tances of private individuals or legal entities closely affiliated to the member, such as referred to in 
the Finnish companies law, shall also be taken into consideration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Moreover, according to the 2008 code the director is not independent of the company or significant shareholder if the director has 
been a non-executive director for more than 12 consecutive years. In addition, the director is not independent of the company if he or 
she has been in the past three years the auditor of the company, a partner or an employee of the present auditor or the director is a 
partner or an employee in an audit firm that has been the company’s auditor in the past three years. 
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2.2. Asymmetric Timeliness  
2.2.1. Timeliness and Earnings Conservatism  
 
Reported earnings are considered to be timely when they fully reflect the information that has been 
incorporated by the market in its pricing of a firm’s equity (Basu 1997). In such cases reported earn-
ings have a direct effect on price movements. However, earnings and prices tend to reflect bad news 
simultaneously, while prices reflect good news faster than accounting earnings. This asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings is at the root of Basu´s concept of earnings conservatism11: The incremental 
timeliness of bad news recognition over good news recognition.  
 
Earnings conservatism can be also thought of as the speed of bad news (losses) recognition in earn-
ings relative to the speed of good news (gains) recognition in earnings (Bushman & Piotroski 
2006). To see this definition clearly, let (G) be the speed of good news recognition and (I) the in-
cremental speed of bad news recognition. Then, the speed of bad news recognition (B) is specified 
as:  
                                                 
                                             IGB +=                                                                        (1)  
 
Equally, earnings conservatism is specified as:  
 
                      
( )
G
I1
G
IG
G
B +=+=                     (2) 
 
Then Equation (2) implies that earnings conservatism increases, for example, by increasing the  
incremental speed of bad news recognition (I) and holding the speed of good news recognition   
constant (G). Alternatively, earnings conservatism increases by decreasing the speed of good news 
recognition (G) holding the incremental speed of bad news recognition (B) constant. Finally, it is 
possible to slow the speed of good news recognition (G) and simultaneously increase the speed of 
bad news (B) recognition (Bushman & Piotroski 2006). 
 
                                                 
11 Also labelled income conservatism (Basu 1997; Ball et al. 2000), news dependent conservatism (Chandra et al. 2004), conditional 
conservatism (Ball & Shivakumar 2005; Beaver & Ryan 2005) or ex-post conservatism (Pope & Walker 2003; Richardson & Tinai-
kar 2004).  
 
 
11
Earnings conservatism has many economic functions (Watts 2003a; Gassen & al. 2006). From the 
point of view of contracting, earnings conservatism can be used in contracts among the different 
parties to the firm to reduce moral hazard problems created by the information asymmetries. Con-
tracts based on conservative numbers reduce the probability of managerial expropriation of share-
holders’ resources or of excessive distribution of resources to the shareholders at the expense of 
debt-holders. Due to these beneficial effects, conservatism is commonly considered an indicator of 
earnings quality or a desirable property of accounting earnings (Ball et al. 2000; Watts 2003b; Fran-
cis et al. 2004; Ball & Shivakumar 2005).  
 
2.2.2. International Findings Related to Asymmetric Timeliness  
 
International differences in asymmetric timeliness of earnings and conservative reporting practices 
have been linked to differences in regulatory infrastructures and the nature of their capital markets 
(Ryan 2006)12. Prior studies indicate that firms in countries with strong investor protection and high 
quality judicial systems reflect bad news in reported earnings numbers in a more timely manner 
than firms in countries with weak investor protections and low quality judicial systems (Bushman & 
Piotroski 2006). International mainstream research especially highlights that demand for conserva-
tive earnings reporting is typical for countries with code law legal structures and market based fi-
nancial systems (e.g. Ball et al. 2000; Giner & Rees, 2001; Garcia Lara & Mora 2004).  
 
However, country specific findings from prior studies indicate asymmetrically timely recognition of 
bad news also in civil law regimes and markets which are commonly considered more bank than 
market based like Finland, Japan, Germany and Scandinavia (Raonic et al. 2004; Bushman & Pio-
troski 2006; Brown et al. 2006). Based on their country specific findings, Bushman & Piotroski 
(2006) report that e.g. in Finland, the speed of bad news recognition is about 19 times higher rela-
tive to good news recognition.13 In addition, Brown et al. (2006) found a positive coefficient with 
earnings asymmetric of bad news (0.22) in Finnish listed firms as well.14 
                                                 
12 Ryan (2006, 514-515) has an extensive typology of international earnings conservatism research. 
  
13 For Finnish firms the coefficients with earnings and good news were (0.006) and earnings and bad news (0.110). The sensitivity to 
bad news relating to good news is calculated as follows: (0.006 + 0.110)/ (0.006) = 19.333. Moreover, the sensitivity to bad news 
relating to good news is 9.231 in Japan, 7.286 in Germany, 12.302 in Sweden, 14.500 in Norway and 7.256 in Denmark (More coun-
try specific findings, see Bushman & Piotroski 2006, page 121 and table 2).  
 
14 That coefficient is also positive for firms from Japan (0.08), Germany (0.19), Sweden (0.26), Norway (0.29) and Denmark (0.16) 
(See Brown et al. 2006, Table 3 in page 614). 
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On the other hand the variation of earnings conservatism is also linked to differences in corporate 
governances. For example, prior empirical findings from Anglo-Saxon market based financial sys-
tems and common law regimes in the UK (Beeches & al. 2004) and US (Ahmed & Dolman 2007) 
indicate that firms with a higher proportion of independent board members report bad news in a 
more timely manner than good news. Moreover, Garcia Lara et al. (2007) report similar findings 
even from the Spanish market, which is a civil law regime and has not commonly been viewed as a 
typical market based financial system.  
 
2.3. Complementary Relation between Board Monitoring and Earnings Conservatism 
 
The board of directors sees to the administration of the company and the appropriate organization of 
its operations (The Finnish Company Act 6:2§). Moreover, the board is created to monitor man-
agement and it is responsible for the appropriate arrangement of the control of the company ac-
counts and finances. Since executive and grey directors’ careers are tied to the CEO, the task of 
arranging of the control is likely to fall mainly on the independent board members. Then the role of 
independent directors is essential for the resolution of agency problems between managers and fin-
anciers as well as shareholders and creditors (Beekes et al. 2004; Ahmed & Duellman 2007). 
 
The timely incorporation of both favorable and especially unfavorable information in earnings faci-
litates effective monitoring of managers by the board of directors and external investors (Beekes et 
al. 2004). The acceleration in the recognition of bad news provides the board of directors with early 
warning signals to investigate the origin of bad news (Garcia Lara et al. 2007). Stronger corporate 
governance, i.e. more independent directors on the board, is expected to result in a higher demand 
for timely information and to prevent managers from hiding less favorable information.  
 
In light of the arguments above, earnings conservatism is a potentially useful tool for independent 
directors fulfilling their role of ratifying and monitoring key decisions on a company board (Beekes 
et al. 2004). Thus boards with more independent directors have a propensity for greater monitoring 
and are therefore expected to insist on greater earnings conservatism. By contrast, firms with poor 
governance structures (i.e. fewer independent directors) may be less inclined to monitor, resulting in 
a greater propensity to delay the recognition of bad news (Beekes et al. 2004). Based upon this, the 
following hypothesis is tested:  
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Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the timeliness of bad news reflected in earnings is po-
sitively related to the proportion of independent directors on the board.  
 
On the other hand, inside directors may have incentives to accelerate good news in earnings for 
opportunistic reasons, for example to enhance the value of their compensation (Healy 1985; see also 
Beekes et al. 2004). Executive directors have a primary allegiance to the CEO.  Moreover, execu-
tive and also grey directors depend on the CEO for continued employment within the organization. 
Therefore their incentives to monitor are considerably weaker than those of independent directors. 
Moreover, independent directors do not typically share in the benefits of such activities. On the con-
trary, they risk loss of reputation on the labor market in the event of earnings being subsequently 
shown to be overstated (Fama, 1980; see also: Beekes et al. 2004). Hence there are strong incen-
tives for independent directors to monitor earnings timeliness.  
 
Given that inside directors may be more inclined to use aggressive income-recognition techniques 
to accelerate the effect of good news, the following hypothesis is also tested:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the timeliness of good news reflected in earnings is ne-
gatively related to the proportion of independent board of directors. 
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3. Research Design     
3.1. Asymmetric Timeliness Model    
 
Following prior work in this area15, my research design uses the Basu (1997) reverse-regression 
model between earnings and contemporaneous returns (Beaver et al. 1980; Beekes et al. 2004). Fol-
lowing Basu (1997) yearly market returns (RETt) are used as a proxy for the existence of news 
about a firm’s performance that is publicly available. It is calculated as logarithmic annual market 
return including dividends RETt = ln(Pt) – ln(Pt-1). Yearly earnings (Et) are measured per share and 
controlled for heteroscedasticity by scaling with prior year-end price giving Et/Pt-1. For simplicity of 
notation, subscripts are not always used in the sequel. 
 
The Basu model incorporates a dummy variable for negative returns (NEG), which interacts with 
the returns variable (RET) to proxy for bad news (NEG·RET). The coefficient for (RET) shows the 
overall impact of returns to earnings and the coefficient for (NEG·RET) the difference in slopes for 
positive and negative earnings. The standard asymmetric timeliness model by Basu (1997) is speci-
fied as follows: 
 
t,it,it.i3t,i2t,i101t,it,i RETNEGRETNEGP/E εββββ +⋅+++=−                   (3) 
 
In the Equation (3), β3 captures the incremental speed of bad news recognition in earnings relative 
to the speed of good news recognition β2. If β3 = 0, there is no difference between the speed of good 
news and bad news recognition, and so β2 captures the speed with which news in general is recog-
nized. However, if β3 ≠ 0, then β2 captures the speed of good news recognition, β3 the incremental 
speed of bad news recognition relative to good news recognition, and (β2 + β3) the speed of bad 
news recognition (Basu 1997; Bushman & Piotroski 2006), both β2 and β3 are expected to be posi-
tive in sign. The intercept coefficient β0 in Equation (3) will reflect the impact of prior years´ good 
news on current period earnings and is anticipated to be positive in sign. In addition, β1 is the mar-
ginal change in the intercept of negative return cases, but there is no expectation for the sign or val-
ue of (NEG). 
 
                                                 
15 See for example: Pope & Walker (1999); Ball et al. (2000), Giner & Rees (2001), Beekes et al. (2004), Raonic et al. (2004), Garcia 
Lara & Mora (2004), Bushman & Piotroski (2006) and Brown et al. (2006). For more empirical work relating to asymmetric timeli-
ness, see Ryan (2006, pages 514-515).  
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The model (3) can be reformulated in a mathematically equivalent form:  
 
                  t,it,it,i4t,it.i3t,i101t,it,i RETPOSRETNEGNEGP/E εββββ +⋅+⋅++=−                  (4) 
 
In Equation (4), POS = 1 – NEG is a proxy for good news. Now, in Equation (4), β3 is exactly the 
same as in (3) and shows the speed of recognition of bad news in earnings, β4 in turn shows the 
speed of good news recognition. Both β3 and β4 are expected to have a positive sign. Equations (3) 
and (4) are exactly equivalent to β4 = β2 + β3. On some occasions, however, the formulation (4) is 
more informative than formulation (3).  
 
3.2. Modeling Asymmetric Timeliness and Board Independence  
 
Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed & Duellman (2007) and Garcia Lara et al. (2007) extend the Basu 
(1997) model to examine the link between asymmetric timeliness and board composition. With a 
larger proportion of independent directors it will be possible to better monitor company activities 
and adopt a conservative earnings reporting tendency due to a greater presence of independent di-
rectors (Beekes et al. 2004; Ahmed & Duellman 2007; Garcia Lara et al. 2007). Under conservat-
ism, earnings have a higher sensitivity to bad news than to good news. Thus, firms with higher in-
dependent director representation on the board are anticipated to incorporate bad news into earnings 
on a timelier basis. Conversely, firms with fewer independent directors are anticipated to be less 
inclined towards bad news reporting. This link is tested by incorporating a continuous variable for 
the proportion of independent directors (INDEP) to the model. This variable is then interacted with 
variables in the standard Basu model as shown in Equation (5): 
 
t,it,it,it,i8
t,it,i7t,it,i6t,i5
t,it,i3t,i2t,i101t,it,i
INDEPRETNEG
INDEPRETINDEPNEGINDEP
RETNEGRETNEGP/E
εγ
γγγ
γγγγ
+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅++
⋅+++=−
                  (5)  
 
In model (5), γ3 (NEG·RET) captures the sensitivity to bad news (exclusive of the effect of good 
news) without the effect of independent directors, while γ8 (NEG·RET·INDEP) captures the mar-
ginal effect of the proportion of independent directors. Parameter γ5 (INDEP) captures the pure 
marginal effect of independent directors and γ6 (NEG·INDEP) the differences of that effect on the 
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bad news and good news reporting. The sign for γ3 is predicted to be positive, but there are no ex-
pectations for the signs of γ5 and γ6. However, Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms with a greater pro-
portion of independent directors will report earnings more conservatively than firms with a smaller 
proportion of independent directors. This is expected to be represented in a significant positive 
coefficient on the γ8 (NEG·RET·INDEP) interaction term.  
 
Distinguishing between good and bad news scenarios could be crucial to understanding how the 
board affects earnings reporting. The difference in reporting timeliness is not expected to be limited 
to bad news (Beekes et al. 2004). Thus, under conservative earnings reporting, good news will be 
reflected in earnings over a number of periods and accounting will be less timely than for bad news. 
There may be a natural tendency for executive directors to emphasize available good news for their 
own bonus and promotional prospects. However, as Beekes et al. (2004) point out, the firms with 
more independent directors will adopt a conservative approach to recording good news in earnings, 
because of the greater constraint placed on managers’ opportunism.    
 
Relative to firms with high independent directors, firms with a lower proportion of independent 
directors are expected to recognize current period good news more aggressively in current period 
earnings (Beekes et al. 2004). Hypothesis 2 therefore predicts a more conservative approach to the 
recognition of good news on earnings by boards with a larger proportion of independent directors. 
In Equation (5), the timeliness of good news is captured by the coefficient on γ2 (RET) without ef-
fect of independent directors and it is expected to be positive in sign. Conversely, the coefficient of 
the interaction term γ7 (RET· INDEP) captures the marginal timeliness effect of the proportion of 
independent directors. Hence, if firms with a lower fraction of independent directors are aggressive 
reporters, the coefficient γ2 will be significantly greater than (γ2 + γ7) and therefore γ7 will be nega-
tive and statistically significant (Beekes et al. 2004). 
 
In line with reformulation of model (3), model (5) can also be reformulated in a mathematically 
equivalent form as follows:  
 
  
t,it,it,it,i9
t,it,it,i8
t,it,i6t,i5
t,it,i4t,it,i3t,i101t,it,i
INDEPRETPOS
INDEPRETNEG
INDEPNEGINDEP
RETPOSRETNEGNEGP/E
εγ
γ
γγ
γγγγ
+⋅⋅+
⋅⋅+
⋅++
⋅+⋅++=−
                 (6)  
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In Equation (6), γ3 (NEG·RET) shows the speed of bad news recognition in earnings without the 
effect of independent directors and γ8 (NEG·RET·INDEP) with the effect of independent directors. 
Likewise, γ4 (POS·RET) shows the speed of good news recognition in earnings without the effect of 
independent directors and γ9 (POS·RET·INDEP) with the effect. Parameter γ9 is expected to be  
negative in sign. On some occasions the formulation (6) is more informative than formulation (5). 
Here again formulation (5) and (6) are equivalent to γ4 = γ2 + γ3. 
 
3.3. Accruals- based Measure of Earnings Conservatism 
 
For sensitively checking an alternative measure to the Basu conservatism model, the Ball & Shiva-
kumar (2005), is used. The reason for using an alternative measure is that concerns have been raised 
in the literature about the use of asymmetric timeliness of earnings as a conservatism measure (Gas-
sen 2006; Dietrich 2007). In particular Dietrich et al. (2007) show that portioning a regression sam-
ple with one of the regressor may produce biased inferences. On the other hand, Ryan (2006) argues 
that the biases introduced by the Basu approach are likely to be small. Moreover, using cumulating 
returns over the fiscal year (as is done in this paper), partially removes the impact of the annual 
earnings announcement on stock prices, which occurs several months after closing (see also Garcia 
Lara et al. 2007). Finally, Ryan (2006) concludes that asymmetric timeliness of losses is still the 
best measure of earnings conservatism. 
 
The Ball & Shivarkumar model of conservatism is accounting based and overcomes most of the 
limitations of the Basu approach (Dietrich et al. 2007; Garcia Lara et al. 2007). The intuition behind 
that model is the same as in the Basu model: Accounting earnings tend to anticipate the recognition 
of bad news and to delay the recognition of good news (Garcia Lara & al. 2007). Total accruals and 
cash flows are negatively associated, but this negative association, because of the asymmetric rec-
ognition of news in earnings, tends to be lower in periods with economic losses16.  
 
Ball & Shivakumar (2005) use the following regression to measure this association between cash 
flows and accruals:  
 
                                                 
16 Total accruals recognize the impact of negative economic events in the period in which they take place. However, negative effects 
tend to affect cash flows faster than positive effects. This asymmetry lowers the negative correlation between cash flows and accruals 
(Garcia Lara et al. 2007).   
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      t,it,it.i3t,i2t,i10t,i CFDCFDACC µδδδδ +⋅+++=                               (7) 
 
where (ACC) are total accruals scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, (CF) is operating cash 
flows scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, (D) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
cash flow is negative and otherwise 0. It captures the occasions when economic losses occurred 
during the period i.e. in the situations when cash flows are negative. Equation (7), δ2 is expected to 
be significantly negative, reflecting the negative association between cash flows and accruals. How-
ever, δ3 is expected to be positive, indicating a reduction in the negative relation between accruals 
and cash flows.  In line with Ball & Shivakumar (2005), there is no prediction for the intercept δ0 or 
the dummy variable δ1.  
 
Following reformulation of model (3), model (7) can be also reformulated in a mathematically 
equivalent form:  
                         
       t,it,it,i4t,it.i3t,i10t,i CFPCFDDACC µδδδδ +⋅+⋅++=                                      (8) 
 
In Equation (8), P = 1 – D. Now, in Equation (8), δ3 captures the speed of negative cash flows rec-
ognition in accruals and δ4 the speed of positive cash flows recognition in accruals. Parameter δ3 is 
expected to be positive and δ4 negative in sign. On some occasions formulation (8) is more informa-
tive than formulation (7).  
 
3.4. Board Independence and Accruals- based Earnings Conservatism 
 
For sensitivity checking, Garcia Lara et al. (2007) use the Ball & Shivakumar model to analyze the 
differences in earnings conservatism across board structures17. Following that, a continuous variable 
(INDEP) is incorporated into model (7) as a proxy for the proportion of the independent directors as 
follows:  
 
                 
t,it,it,it,i8
t,it,i7t,it,i6t,i5
t,it,i3t,i2t,i10t,i
INDEPCFD
INDEPCFINDEPDINDEP
CFDCFDACC
µη
ηηη
ηηηη
+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅++
⋅+++=
                                (9) 
                                                 
17 Garcia Lara et al. (2007) report that results by using Ball & Shivarkumar model were in line with using Basu results: strong corpo-
rate governance firms report earnings more conservative than weak governance firms.   
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In model (9), the positive cash flow is captured by the coefficient on η2 (CF) without effect of inde-
pendent directors. Parameter η2 is expected to be negative in sign. Moreover, interaction η3 (D·CF) 
captures the sensitivity of negative cash flows exclusive of the effect of independent directors. The 
coefficient η3 is predicted to be positive indicating a reduction in the negative relation between ac-
cruals and cash flows.  
 
Analogously with model (5) term η5 (INDEP) captures the pure marginal effect of independent di-
rectors and η6 (D·INDEP) the differences of that effect on the negative cash flows (bad news) and 
positive cash flows (good news) reporting. There are no expectations for the signs of η5 and η6. The 
coefficient on the interaction term η7 (CF·INDEP) captures the marginal effect of the proportion of 
independent directors. Then, if firms with a higher proportion of independent directors report posi-
tive cash flows in a less timely manner, the coefficient η7 should be significantly negative. The 
coefficient on interaction variable η8 (D·CF·INDEP), captures the marginal effect of the proportion 
of independent directors. If firms with a higher fraction of independent directors report negative 
cash flows in a more timely manner, this is expected to be represented in a significant positive coef-
ficient η8.   
 
In line with the reformulation of model (5), model (9) can be reformulated in a mathematically 
equivalent form as follows:  
 
  
t,it,it,it,i9t,it,it,i8
t,it,i6t,i5
t,it,i4t,it,i3t,i10t,i
INDEPCFPINDEPCFD
INDEPDINDEP
CFPCFDDACC
µηη
ηη
ηηηη
+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+
⋅++
⋅+⋅++=
                         (10)  
 
In Equation (10), η3 (D·CF) shows the speed of negative cash flow recognition in accruals without 
the effect of independent directors and η8 (D·CF·INDEP) with the effect of independent directors. 
Equally, η4 (P·CF) shows the speed of positive cash flows recognition in accruals without the effect 
of independent directors and η9 (P·CF·INDEP) with the independent directors. The parameter η9 is 
expected to be negative in sign. On some occasions formulation (10) is more informative than for-
mulation (9). 
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4. Sample Construction and Data 
 
The sample consists of all December fiscal year-end non-financial Finnish (headquarter in Finland) 
OMX- listed firms from 2003 to 2005. December year-ends are used to ensure that all companies 
are subject to similar market conditions. Financial firms are excluded because of the different ac-
counting practices (see e.g. Ahmed & Duellman 2007; Garcia Lara et al. 2007).  
 
The Finnish data serves well for this study for two specific reasons: First, Finland has very low le-
vels of corruption and its firms operate in a legal environment in which there is widespread respect 
for contracts and the rule of law (e.g. Transparency International 2005). It is reasonable to assume 
that the higher the overall level of business ethics, the higher the level of financial reporting quality, 
either because there is an accounting measure contained in the ranking criteria, or because the quali-
ty of accounting and business practice is highly correlated (Lindahl & Schadewitz 2009). In that 
sense, accounting quality in Finland is one of the best in the world18. Second, the Corporate Gover-
nance Code for Finnish listed firms is very detailed by international standards (OECD 2004; Euro-
pean Corporate Governance Institute 2009; Securities Market Association 2009). It sets very specif-
ic criteria for evaluating directors’ independence. That code was issued in December 2003, so the 
period 2003-2005 is suitable for this study.  
 
The data were hand collected from various official, publicly available sources, primarily from an-
nual reports and firms` web pages. Supplementary resources were the web pages of OMX group 
and the yearbook “Listed Companies in Finland”, which relies on data from the Finnish Central 
Depository or the firm’s depository register. In 2003 and 2004 financial statement information is 
reported and calculated in accordance with FAS, excluding 3 firms in 2003 and 8 firms in 2004, 
which report only IFRS numbers. In 2005 all firms in the sample have reported in accordance with 
IFRS because the European Union (EU) requires that as of 2005 all listed firms in EU should pre-
pare financial statements under IFRS19. The summary of the sample is given in Table 1.  
                                                 
18 For example, based on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Finland was in the top 2 during the period 2003-2005 indicating 
almost the lowest level of corruption in the world (Transparency International 2004, 2005 and 2006). Moreover, based on The Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) Finland tops the ranking in 2003 and 2004 and was second in 2005 (Lopez et al. 2004, 2005 and 2006).    
 
19 IFRS emphasizes the importance of fair value accounting, which essentially demands symmetric timeliness of earnings, i.e. both 
good and bad news should be reported in a timely manner. In addition, Lantto & Sahlström (2008) report that the adoption of IFRS 
by Finnish listed companies during 2002-2004 considerably increases the income statement profit. Thus it is reasonable to assume 
that IFRS adoption could lower the asymmetric timeliness of earnings in this sample. However, the purpose of this study is to ex-
amine the link between board independence and asymmetric timeliness not the increase or decrease of conservatism level between 
the years. Moreover, I use a pooled regression sample not panel methods because the purpose is not to compare firms with each 
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Table 1  
Summary of the sample 
 
    
(A) Sample selection of Finnish listed firms from 2003 to 2005
Number of Finnish listed firm years from 2003 to 2005 410
Financial services and insurance firms -58
Financial year differs from calendar year -25
Missing annual report data -11
Sample with all necessary accounting and market data 316
Corporate governance reporting did not meet all the data reguirements -113
Influential outlier -1
Final Sample 202
(B) Sample firm breakdown by industry
Materials 25 12.4 %
Industrial 60 29.4 %
Consumer Discretionary 33 16.3 %
Consumer Staples 13 6.4 %
Health Care 7 3.5 %
Information Technology 58 28.7 %
Telecommunication Services 3 1.5 %
Utilities 3 1.5 %
      
 
In Table 1 panel A presents a summary of how the final sample was obtained20. Of the 410 Finnish 
listed firms in the sample 58 firm–years are eliminated in the financial services and insurance indus-
tries. Moreover, 25 firm–years are eliminated because the financial year differs from the calendar 
year and 11 firm-years due to missing annual report data21. Thus, the sample with all necessary ac-
counting and market data consists of 316 firm-year observations. In addition, 113 firm-year obser-
vations are excluded because corporate governance reporting does not meet all the data require-
ments for the purpose of this study.  To control for the effects of influential outliers, it is justified to 
delete one observation from the sample on the basis of the total accruals and cash flows22.  Thus, the 
final sample consists of 202 observations for 100 distinct firms. The distribution of the sample firms 
                                                                                                                                                                  
other. Then it is reasonable to assume that differences with accounting standards between the years are not a significant problem for 
this study.   
 
20 Detailed description of data selection process is presented in appendixes A an B. 
 
21 Firms with missing annual reports were typically those with mergers during the financial year.   
 
22 That observation has total accruals scaled by total assets 2.399 (more than 7 times higher that the second largest observation value 
0.305 in Table 3) and scaled cash flows from operations -3.068 (more than 14 times lower than the second lowest value -0.213). That 
observation was then justifiably classified as an outlier and excluded from the sample.   
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across years is as follows: 20 firms are included in only one year, 58 firms are included in two years 
and 22 firms have data for each of the sample years.  
 
Table 1 panel B presents the industry breakdown of the sample firms in accordance with the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS). The largest industry is industrial with 60 firm-year obser-
vations, representing 29.7 % of the sample. Moreover, information technology with 58 firm-year 
observations represents 28.7 % of the sample.  
 
Table 2 
Variable definitions 
      
   
E/P   Earnings per share after extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-period share price 
RET  Logarithmic annual buy-and-hold return 
NEG  Dummy variable coded 1 if RET negative, otherwise 0 
POS  Dummy variable which equals 1 - NEG. Coded 1 if RET positive, otherwise 0.  
NEG·RET  Logarithmic annual buy-and-hold return for bad news (negative return) 
POS·RET  Logarithmic annual buy-and-hold return for good news (positive return) 
INDEP  Proportion of board members independent of the company  
ACC  Total accruals scaled by total asset at the beginning-of-period 
CF  Cash flows from operations scaled by beginning of period total assets 
D  Dummy variable coded 1 if CF negative, otherwise 0 
P  Dummy variable which equals 1 - D. Coded 1 if CF positive, otherwise 0. 
D·CF  Negative cash flows from operations scaled by beginning-of-period total assets 
P·CF  Positive cash flows from operations scaled by beginning-of-period total assets 
      
 
 
A summary of variable definitions is presented in Table 2. To control for heteroscedasticity, earn-
ings are measured per share and deflated by the prior year-end stock price. In addition, return is 
annual logarithmic share return including dividends23. Moreover, following Ball & Shivakumar 
(2005) both accruals and cash from operations are standardized by beginning of period total assets. 
As a further control for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, Newey - West autocorrelation and 
White heteroscedasticity corrected t-values are used in hypothesis testing (White 1980).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23Calculated as follows: ln(P t + dividends paid in year t) –ln(Pt-1). 
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Table 3  
Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables for the sample of 202 firm-year    
observation over the period 2003 – 2005 
                
        
(A) Continuous variables   
   
 Mean   Std.dev.      Min       25 %  Median 75 %     Max 
E/P 0.053 0.149 -0.656 0.040 0.068 0.102 0.956
RET 0.101 0.135 -0.242 0.023 0.093 0.185 0.575
NEG·RET -0.076 0.062 -0.242 -0.120 -0.063 -0.026 -0.001
POS·RET 0.150 0.105 0.001 0.071 0.125 0.217 0.575
INDEP 0.723 0.235 0.000 0.571 0.800 0.900 1.000
ACC -0.061 0.110 -0.835 -0.109 -0.054 -0.001 0.305
CF 0.144 0.122 -0.213 0.069 0.127 0.224 0.542
D·CF -0.057 0.063 -0.213 -0.089 -0.032 -0.011 -0.001
P·CF 0.168 0.103 0.005 0.092 0.143 0.239 0.542
 
        
(B) Dichotomy variables 
      
 Firm years Percentage of Sample   
Negative returns (NEG):  44 21.8 %     
Negative cash flows (D):  22 10.9 %     
              
       
 
Panel A in Table 3 shows that the median of reported earnings is above the mean, so the earnings 
are negatively skewed. It indicates asymmetric timeliness of earnings, i.e. conservative earnings 
reporting. In addition, accruals are on average negative due to the effect of amortization and depre-
ciation.  
 
Panel B in Table 3 shows that on average 72.3 % of the directors are independent. The proportion of 
independent directors in this sample is substantially higher than the UK sample (43.9 %) or Spanish 
sample (36.0 %) but slightly lower than in the US sample (77.5 %)24. This rather high level of inde-
pendent directors on boards indicates that Finnish listed firms are keen on board independence and 
high-level corporate governance.  
 
                                                 
24 UK sample Beekes et al. (2004), Spanish sample Garcia Lara et al. (2007) and US sample Ahmed & Duellman (2007).  
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5. Results    
5.1. Asymmetric Timeliness  
 
The estimation the results of the standard Basu models are given in Table 4. The results of estimat-
ing model (1) standard Basu show that the dummy variable for bad news (NEG) is statistically in-
significant. It indicates that the slopes of good news (RET) and bad news (NEG·RET) intersect 
when the (RET) is 0.  In order to guarantee this, in model (2a) the regression coefficient β1 of the 
dummy variable (NEG) is set at 0.  
 
The results from model (2a) show that the parameters (RET) and (NEG·RET) are statistically sig-
nificant and have the predicted sign. The slope coefficient for negative returns is higher (0.967) than 
the slope coefficient for positive returns (0.351). Consistent with my expectation that bad news are 
reflected in earnings on a more timely basis than good news, the result in model (2a) shows, that the 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news is 3.75525 times steeper than that for good news. It gives an indi-
cation that under the standard Basu interpretation of conservatism, Finnish listed firms report earn-
ings in a conservatively manner.  Model (2a) may be reformulated as model (2b), where a different 
coefficient for positive and negative returns is calculated. The return for negative earnings in model 
(2b) is (1.318) as can be concluded from model (2a) because the models are mathematically equiva-
lent26. 
 
5.2. Effect of Board Composition on Asymmetric Timeliness 
 
The standard Basu model was then modified by introducing a continuous variable (INDEP), which 
is the proportion of independent directors. It is used to link asymmetric timeliness and board com-
position. The estimation the results of the modified Basu models are given in Table 5. In model (3) 
the effect on independent directors (INDEP) and its interaction with bad news (NEG·INDEP) are 
incorporated into the model. The slope coefficient for negative returns (0.927) and for positive re-
turns (0.339) remains very close to the coefficient in the model (2a). The coefficient of (INDEP) is 
significant and positive, though small, showing that independent directors have a positive effect on 
the market reaction to reported earnings. However, the coefficient (NEG·INDEP) is insignificant.  
 
                                                 
25 [=0.351 + 0.967)/0.351] 
 
26 See model (2a): (RET) + (NEG·RET) = 0.351 + 0.967 = 1.318.  
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This result gives an indication that independent directors, as such, have no effect on the differences 
with the sensitivity of bad news and good news reporting. The positive coefficient with 
(RET·INDEP) in model (4) indicates that a larger proportion of independent directors on the board 
could encourage rapid reaction to good news incorporation in earnings. Conversely, the coefficient 
on (NEG·RET·INDEP), which reflects the timeliness of bad news reporting with the effect of inde-
pendent directors, is negative. These results are interesting, but statistically insignificant.  
 
However, the results from model (5a) show in a statistically significantly manner that a larger pro-
portion of independent directors on the board will encourage a more timely approach to good news 
incorporation in earnings. In addition, model (5a) can be reformulated as model (5b), where a dif-
ferent coefficient for positive returns with more independent directors (POS·RET·INDEP) and neg-
ative returns with more independent directors (NEG·RET·INDEP) is calculated. In model (5b) the 
coefficient for positive returns with more independent directors (POS·RET·INDEP = 0.530) is equal 
to the coefficient for (RET·INDEP) in model (5a). Moreover, the coefficient for negative returns 
with more independent directors (NEG·RET·INDEP) is negative (-1.651) and statistically insignifi-
cant as in model (5a). This indicates that there is no greater earnings conservatism in firms with 
more independent directors in the board.  
 
The results of model (6a) show that the difference between the slope coefficients for positive re-
turns versus negative returns (NEG·RET) is significant (0.956).  It is almost similar to the differ-
ences with slope coefficients for (RET) and (NEG·RET) in models (2a) and (3). The difference  
between negative and positive reaction is the same, not regarding the proportion of independent 
directors.   
 
The estimated coefficient of (RET·INDEP) in model (6a) equals (0.382). Though insignificant, it 
gives an indication that there are effects that increase the reaction on returns by (0.0382) for each 10 
% of independent directors. When the proportion of independent directors is 72.5 %27, models (2b) 
and (6a) give almost the same result. It is notable, that the mean of (INDEP) in the whole sample 
equals (0.723) which corresponds well to (0.725). These findings give support to the results ob-
tained. Model (6a) can also be interpreted in such a way that independent directors do not cause a 
direct increase to market reaction but may have an indirect effect by increasing the market`s cre-
dence in the board and their reporting. Note that the coefficient for (RET) is now insignificant. This 
implies that when the number of independent directors is taken into account there is no overall ef-
                                                 
27 Calculated as follows: [(0.351-0.074)/0.382] = 0.725.   
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fect. Thus, it may be concluded that the overall impact of (RET) may be due in part to the number 
of independent directors.  
 
When model (6a) is reformulated as model (6b), where a different coefficient for positive returns 
(POS·RET), positive returns with more independent directors (POS·RET·INDEP) and negative re-
turns without independent directors (NEG·RET) are obtained. The results show that the coefficient 
for positive returns with more independent directors (POS·RET·INDEP) is (0.530). The coefficient 
for negative returns (NEG·RET) in model (6b) is (1.321). This indicates that the bad news is re-
ported in a timely manner even without the effect of independent board members. However, the 
coefficient for positive returns without the effect of independent directors (POS·RET) is low           
(-0.035) and statistically insignificant. This implies that when the number of independent directors 
is taken into account there is no overall effect except when returns are positive. 
 
In my final model (6c) the term (POS·RET) is set at 0. In line with model (6b), the coefficient for 
positive returns with more independent directors (POS·RET·INDEP) is (0.492)28. Moreover, the 
return for negative earnings in model (6c) is (1.313), and models (6b) and (6c) yield essentially the 
same results. Moreover, if the proportion of independent directors is at the population average (IN-
DEP = 72.3 %) models (2a) and (6c) yield almost identical results. However, model (6c) gives par-
simonious additional information and understanding on the subject.  
                                                 
28 See model (6b): (POS·RET) + (POS·RET·INDEP) = (-) 0.035+ 0.530 = 0.495. 
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5.3. Conclusions on the Effect of Asymmetric Timeliness and Board Composition 
 
If the board composition is not included in the model, reasonable results with R2 about 0.28 are ob-
tained. However, the models can be refined by introducing board composition (INDEP). This will 
increase fit R2 to 0.30. With a further refinement with different models for board composition effect 
for negative (bad news) and positive (good news) returns, the models can be simplified without es-
sentially losing fit, but a gain from a simpler model and easier interpretation is achieved.    
          
            
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
-0,2 -0,1 0 0,1 0,2
Returns
Impact of Board Composition on Earnings Timeliness 
INDEP=100%
INDEP=80%
INDEP=60%
INDEP=40%
INDEP=20%
INDEP=0%
 
Figure 1. Impact of Board Composition on Earnings Timeliness  
 
The final model (6c) is illustrated in Figure 1. When earnings are negative the line is deep (coeffi-
cient with 1.313) and does not depend on the number of independent directors (INDEP). In that 
sense, my findings are inconsistent with the findings from the UK, US and Spanish markets (Beekes 
et al. 2004; Ahmed & Duellman 2007; Garcia Lara et al. 2007) that the timeliness of bad news re-
flected in earnings is positively related to the proportion of the independent directors. Then my Hy-
pothesis 1 is rejected.  
 
When earnings are positive the line is gentler, starting from a vertical line when there are no inde-
pendent directors on the board (i.e. INDEP = 0). It indicates that without the effect of independent 
 
 
30
directors, the bad news (negative returns) are reflected in earnings on a more timely basis than good 
news (positive returns). This finding is consistent with the prior findings (Raonic et al. 2004; 
Bushman & Piotroski 2006 and Brown et al. 2006) with Finnish data showing that under the Basu 
interpretation of conservatism, Finnish listed firms report earnings in a conservative manner.  
 
With increasing number of independent directors the line on the positive (good news) side becomes 
steeper but always gentler than on the negative side. This result is interesting, because it indicates 
that board independence increases the timeliness of good news reporting. Then, my Hypothesis 2, 
stating that the timeliness of good news reflected in earnings is negatively related to the proportion 
of independent board members, is rejected. In fact, the timeliness of good news reporting is at its 
maximum (coefficient 0.492), when the whole board consists of independent directors. However, 
the result can also be interpreted in such a way that independent directors do not cause a direct in-
crease in market reaction to good news (positive returns) but has an indirect effect by increasing the 
markets’ credence in the board and their reporting.  
 
5.4. Accruals and Board Composition 
 
To sensitively check an alternative measure to the Basu conservatism model, the Ball & Shivaku-
mar model (2005), is tested. The estimation results for the standard Ball & Shivakumar model are 
given in Table 6. The reason for using an alternative measure is that concerns have been raised in 
about the limitations of the Basu method to measure earnings conservatism (Ryan 2006). In particu-
lar Dietrich et al. (2007) point out that portioning a regression sample with one of the regressors 
may produce biased inferences. However, the intuition behind the Ball & Shivakumar model is the 
same as in the Basu model: Accounting earnings tend to anticipate the recognition of bad news and 
to delay the recognition of good news (Garcia Lara et al. 2007). 
 
The results obtained by applying the standard Ball & Shivakumar model (7) show that the relation 
with accruals and cash flows is negative as expected, and that the relation is statistically significant. 
Moreover, the positive relation with accruals and negative cash flows suggests lower asymmetry of 
news recognition in periods with economic losses, but this relation is statistically insignificant. In 
addition, the statistically insignificant dummy variable for bad news (D) in model (7) indicates that 
the slopes of good news and bad news intersect when (CF) is 0. In that sense, the results are in line 
with the Basu model.  
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In order to guarantee this, in model (8) the regression coefficient δ1 of the dummy variable (D) is set 
at 0. The result from model (8) confirming the finding that the relation to accruals and cash flows is 
negative and statistically significant, but the positive relation to accruals and negative cash flows is 
statistically insignificant. In that sense, the results are inconsistent with asymmetric timeliness  
model (2).  
 
In model (9), the different slope coefficients of both negative and positive cash flows are estimated. 
In line with model (8), the slope coefficient with accruals and positive cash flows (good news) is 
statistically significant and similar to that in model (8)29. Moreover, the results from model (9) con-
firm that the slope coefficient with accruals and negative cash flows (bad news) are statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that the slope coefficient with accruals and negative cash flows is flat, 
giving no statistically significant evidence for the assumption that recognition of bad news in earn-
ings, tends to be lower in periods with economic losses. 
 
The standard Ball & Shivakumar model was then modified using a continuous variable (INDEP). 
The estimation results are given in Table 7. In line with the asymmetric timeliness model (4), model 
(10) shows that independent directors as such lower the negative association between accruals and 
cash flows. However, model (11) gives no statistically significant indication for that finding.  
 
Moreover, the insignificant coefficients with negative cash flows in firms with more independent 
directors (D·CF·INDEP) in models (10) and (12) give an indication that there is no greater earnings 
conservatism in firms with more independent directors on the board. In that sense, the results are in 
line with the findings from asymmetric timeliness models (4) to (5b) in Table 5, but inconsistent 
with prior findings from the Spanish markets (Garcia Lara et al. 2007).  
 
In addition, in model (12) the coefficient with positive cash flows with more independent directors 
(P·CF·INDEP) is positive but statistically insignificant. In that sense, the results are inconsistent 
with asymmetric timeliness models (5b), (6b) and (6c). In summary, the results from models (10) to 
(12) show that firms with more independent directors (INDEP) have no direct or indirect reaction to  
negative cash flows (bad news) or positive cash flows (good news) reporting. 
                                                 
29 See models (8) and (9): 0.160 = [0.644 + (-0.484)].  
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6. Summary and Further Research   
 
This study examined the link between board independence and asymmetric timeliness of earnings in 
a Finnish bank-oriented financial system. In asymmetric timeliness, earnings are more sensitive to 
bad news (negative returns) than to good news (positive returns). The incremental timeliness of bad 
news recognition over good news recognition is the root of Basu`s (1997) concept of earnings con-
servatism.  
 
This study extends the prior research by Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed & Duellman (2007) and Gar-
cia Lara et al. (2007) and investigates the relationship between board composition and asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings in civil law regimes and capital markets, which are not commonly viewed as 
typically market-based. Here it is assumed that the proportion of independent directors are better 
able to monitor the activities of senior management influence earnings conservatism. Conversely, 
firms with a lower proportion of independent directors on the board are expected to exhibit less 
conservative tendencies. Moreover, this study retests findings reporting asymmetrically timely rec-
ognition of bad news (Raonic et al. 2004, Bushman & Piotroski 2006 and Brown et al. 2006) using 
Finnish data.  
 
The models by Basu (1997) and Ball & Shivakumar (2005) are re-estimated. The Ball & Shivaku-
mar model is entirely accounting based, but the intuition behind it is the same as in the Basu model: 
Because of the asymmetric recognition of news in earnings, bad news (negative cash flows) is rec-
ognized in a timely manner and recognition of good news (positive cash flows) is delayed. The re-
sults obtained using the Basu model show that bad news (negative returns) is reflected in earnings 
on a more timely basis than good news (positive returns). In this respect the results from Finnish 
data earlier are in line with findings. Instead, it was unexpectedly found, that timeliness of bad news 
reporting does not depend on the number of independent directors, but that the timeliness of good 
news reporting does. In that sense, my findings are inconsistent with the findings from the UK, US 
and Spanish markets (Beekes et al. 2004; Ahmed & Duellman 2007; Garcia Lara et al. 2007). In 
fact, the timeliness of good news reporting is at its maximum when the whole board consists of in-
dependent directors. However, the result can also be interpreted in such a way that independent di-
rectors do not cause a direct increase in the market reaction to good news (positive returns) but have 
an indirect effect by increasing the markets` credence in the board and their reporting.  
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The results from the Ball & Shivakumar model shows that inconsistently with the Basu model, the 
timely recognition of bad news (negative cash flows) compared to good news (positive cash flows) 
is statistically insignificant. However, the result from the Ball & Shivakumar model confirms the 
findings that there is no greater earnings conservatism in firms with more independent directors on 
the board. In that sense, the results are in line with the Basu model used in this study, but inconsis-
tent with findings from the Spanish markets (Garcia Lara et al. 2007). Moreover, the Ball & Shiva-
kumar model show, that timeliness of good news reporting does not dependent on the number of 
independent directors either. In summary, the results from the Ball & Shivakumar model indicate 
that firms with more independent directors have no direct or indirect reaction to negative cash flows 
(bad news) or positive cash flows (good news) reporting.  
 
In future it would be interesting to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings in other markets e.g. in Germany, Scandinavia or the Baltic 
Countries. Moreover more research is needed to take a closer look at firms assessing and recruiting 
independent board members, and especially what core competences firms require in independent 
directors. These are interesting questions which are left for future research.  
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Appendix A   
 
Sample Construction of observation with all necessary accounting and market data 
 
 
Table A1 
Sample selection in numbers by year   
 
 
 
Table A1 serves as a summary by year of, how the sample with all necessary accounting and 
market data is obtained. Table A2 panel A lists the firms, which are excluded from the sample 
because of being non-Finnish. In addition, Table A2 panel B show which firms are eliminated 
because of being financial services and insurance industries. Moreover, Table A2 panel C shows 
the firms, which are excluded because the financial year differs from the calendar year. Finally, 
Table A2 panel D lists the firms which are listed or delisted during the financial year in question 
or with missing annual report data.  
 
 
 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 Total 
OMX listed firms end of the year* 145 137 137 419
Foreign firms -3 -3 -3 -9
Finnish listed firms from 2003 to 2005 142 134 134 410
Financial Services and Insurance firms -21 -19 -18 -58
Financial Year differs from calendar year -10 -8 -7 -25
Listed or delisted during the financial year or missing annual report data -5 -1 -5 -11
Sample with all necessary accounting and market data 106 106 104 316
CG- reporting did not meet all the data reguirements -82 -23 -8 -113
Influential outlier 0 -1 0 -1
Final Sample 24 82 96 202
*Nasdaq OMX (2009): Helsinki Yearly Statistics 1990-2008
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Table A2  
Firms excluded from the sample  
 
 
(A) Foreign firms
2003 2004 2005
1 Nordea 1 Nordea 1 Nordea
2 OMHEX (OMX) 2 OMX (OMHEX) 2 OMX (OMHEX)
3 TeliaSonera 3 TeliaSonera 3 TeliaSonera
(B) Financial Services and Insurance firms    
2003 2004 2005
1 Amanda Capital 1 Amanda Capital 1 Amanda Capital
2 CapMan 2 CapMan 2 CapMan
3 Citycon 3 Citycon 3 Citycon
4 eQ 4 eQ 4 eQ
5 Interavanti 5 Interavanti 5 Interavanti
6 J. Tallberg-Kiinteistöt 6 J. Tallberg-Kiinteistöt 6 J. Tallberg-Kiinteistöt
7 Menire (Turvatiimi) 7 Menire (Turvatiimi) 7 Turvatiimi (Menire)
8 Neomarkka 8 Neomarkka 8 Neomarkka
9 Norvestia 9 Norvestia 9 Norvestia
10 OKO 10 OKO 10 OKO 
11 Panostaja 11 Panostaja 11 Panostaja 
12 Pohjola-Yhtymä 12 Pohjola-Yhtymä 12 Pohjola-Yhtymä 
13 Polar Kiinteistöt 13 Ruukki Group 13 Ruukki Group
14 Ruukki Group 14 Sampo 14 Sampo 
15 Sampo 15 Sponda 15 Sponda
16 Sponda 16 SSK 16 SSK
17 SSK 17 Technopolis 17 Technopolis
18 Technopolis 18 Turun Arvokiinteistöt 18 Ålandsbanken 
19 Turun Arvokiinteistöt 19 Ålandsbanken 
20 Ypankki Skop 
21 Ålandsbanken 
(C) Financial year differs from calendar year   
2003 2004 2005
1 Efore 1 Efore 1 Efore 
2 Kone 2 Kone 2 Kone 
3 Plandent 3 Plandent 3 Suomen Helasto 
4 Rapala VMC 4 Suomen Helasto 4 Puuharyhmä
5 Sentera 5 Tervakosken Puuhamaa 5 Turkistuottajat
6 Suomen Helasto 6 Turkistuottajat 6 Vaahto Group
7 Tervakosken Puuhamaa 7 Vaahto Group 7 Viking Line
8 Turkistuottajat 8 Viking Line
9 Vaahto Group
10 Viking Line
(D) Annual Report data missing or firm is listed or delisted during the financial year 
2003 2004 2005
1 Eimo 1 Kemira GrowHow 1 Neste Oil
2 Hackman 2 Cargotec
3 Instrumentarium 3 AffectoGenimap
4 Janton 4 Alma Media
5 Novo Group 5 Saunalahti Group 
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Appendix B  
 
Board independence reporting in Finnish listed firms 2003 – 2005 
 
 
This appendix presents information on, how the board of directors` independence is reported in 
Finnish listed firms during the period 2003 – 2005. The sample covers the 316 firm year observations 
with all necessary accounting and market data (see Appendix A). Covering the implementation of 
Corporate Governance (CG) Code 2003 and of board independence reporting, the reporting practices 
are divided into the following eight categories:  
1. The board members` independence is evaluated according to the CG Code 2003. 
Evaluation found in the annual report or firm`s web pages. 
 
2. The firm reports that it complies with the CG Code 2003. However, the board members` 
independence is reported only in web pages and for the year in question, it can no longer 
be verified.  
 
3. The firm reports that it complies with the CG Code 2003, but the evaluation of board 
members` independence is not found in the annual report. 
 
4. The firm explains that it does not follow CG Code 2003 to its full extent but it is unclear, 
which of directors are independent and which are not. 
 
5. The firm reports that the implementation of CG Code 2003 is in process, but so far the 
firm follows the earlier code, CG - Code 1997.  
 
6. The firm explains that the implementation of CG Code 2003 is in process.  
 
7. The firm reports that it follows CG Code 1997 or firm`s own governance principles.  
 
8. There is no reference to CG reporting.   
 
Tables B1 to B3 show the results by financial year. Only the firms` in category 1 (bold face in Tables) 
are adopted in this study. The abbreviation AR refers to Annual Report and term REFERENCE 
indicate the source(s) where the evaluation of board independence is found. 
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Table B1.  Board Independence reporting in financial year 2003 
 
 
COMPANY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 REFERENCE
Aldata Solution x AR 2003, p.29
Alma Media x AR 2003, p. 46 and firm´s web pages 22.3.06
Amer x AR 2003, p. 70
Aspo x AR 2003, p. 43
Aspocomp Group x AR 2003, p. 10
Atria x -
Basware x AR 2003, p. 11
Beltton x AR 2003, p. 34
Benofon x -
Biohit x AR 2004, p. 20
Biotie Therapies x -
Birka Line x -
Chips x -
Componenta x AR 2003, p. 3 and firm´s web pages 31.7.06
Comptel x AR 2003, p. 52
Done Solutions x -
Elcoteq x AR 2005, p. 75-76 and 79
Elecster x -
Elektrobit x -
Elisa x -
Endero x AR 2003, p. 14
Espoon Sähkö (E.ON Finland) x -
Etteplan x AR 2003, p.15
Evia x AR 2003, p. 14
Evox Rifa Group x -
Exel x AR 2003, p. 13-14
Finnair x AR 2003, p. 18
Finnlines x AR 2003, p. 48
Fiskars x AR 2003, p. 39
Fortum x AR 2003, p. 39
F-Secure x AR 2003, p. 11
HK Ruokatalo x AR 2003, p. 55
Honkarakenne x -
Huhtamäki x AR 2003, p. 27-28
Ilkka-Yhtymä x -
Incap x AR 2003, p. 45
Jaakko Pöyry Group x -
Kasola x AR 2003, p. 4
KCI Konecranes x AR 2003, p. 55
Kekkilä x -
Kemira x AR 2003, p. 39
Keskisuomalainen x AR 2003, p. 10
Kesko x AR 2003, p. 49-50
Kesla x -
Kylpyläkasino x -
Kyro x AR 2003, p. 51
Larox x -
Lassila & Tikanoja x -
Lemminkäinen x AR 2003, p. 62
Leo Longlife x -
Lännen Tehtaat x -
3 
 
 
COMPANY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 REFERENCE
Marimekko x AR 2003, p. 43
Martela x AR 2003, p. 36
Metso x AR 2003, p. 44-45
M-real x AR 2003, p. 21
Nokia x AR 2003, p. 63
Nokian Renkaat x AR 2003, p. 75
Nordic Aluminium x -
Okmetic x -
Olvi x
Orion x AR 2003, p. 16
Outokumpu x AR 2003, p. 92
Perlos x AR 2003, p. 42 ja 45
PKC Group x AR 2003, p. 42
PMJ Automec (Cencorp) x Web annual report 2003
Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino x -
Ponsse x -
Proha x -
QPR Software x -
Raisio x AR 2003, p. 57
Rakentajain Konevuokraamo x -
Ramirent x -
Rautaruukki x AR 2003, p. 26-27 and 30
Raute x AR 2003, p. 42
Rocla x AR 2003, p. 46 
SanomaWSOY x AR 2003, p. 32
Satama Interactive x Firm´s web pages 8.7.2006
Saunalahti Group x AR 2003, p. 40
Scanfil x -
Solteq x -
SSH Communication Securities x AR 2003, p. 40-41
Stockmann x AR 2003, p. 10
Stonesoft x AR 2003, p. 16
Stora Enso x AR 2003, p. 38
Stromsdal x -
Suomen Spar x AR 2003, p. 3 ja 17
Suominen Yhtymä x -
Sysopen x AR 2003, p. 16
Talentum x AR 2003, p. 16
Tamfelt x AR 2003, p. 10-11 and 14
Tamro x Web annual report 2003, 12.2.07
Tecnomen x AR 2003, p. 22, 48 & firm´s web pages 15.11.06
Tekla x AR 2003, p. 6
Teleste x AR 2003, p. 8
TietoEnator x AR 2003, p. 36
Tieto-X x AR 2003, p. 12
TJ- Group x AR 2003, p. 14 and firm´s web pages 17.1.07
Tulikivi x AR 2003, p. 17
UPM-Kymmene x AR 2003, p. 91
Uponor x AR 2003, p. 51
Vacon x AR 2003, p. 22
Vaisala x -
Wärtsilä x AR 2003, p. 29
YIT x AR 2003, p. 103
Yleiselektroniikka x -
Yomi x AR 2003, p. 18
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Table B2.  Board Independence reporting in financial year 2004 
 
 
COMPANY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 REFERENCE
Aldata Solution x AR 2004, p. 47
Alma Media x AR 2004, p. 47-48
Amer x AR 2004, p. 86
Aspo x AR 2004, p. 25
Aspocomp Group x AR 2004, p. 58
Atria x AR 2004 p.7 and firm´s web pages 8.11.05
Basware x AR 2004 p.20 and firm´s web pages 8.11.06
Beltton x AR 2004, p. 36
Benofon x Firm´s web pages 9.11.05
Biohit x AR 2004, p. 20
Biotie Therapies x Firm´s web pages 9.11.05
Birka Line x AR 2004, p. 40
Chips x AR 2004, p. 34
Componenta x AR 2004, p. 6
Comptel x AR 2004, p. 54
Done Solutions x -
E.ON Finland (Espoon Sähkö) x AR 2004 p.40
Elcoteq Network x AR 2004 p. 69
Elecster x Firm´s web pages 12.11.05
Elektrobit x Firm´s web pages 12.11.05
Elisa x AR 2004, p. 53
Endero x AR 2004, p. 11
Etteplan x AR 2004, p. 35
Evia x AR 2004, p. 19
Evox Rifa Group x Firm´s web pages 19.11.05
Exel x AR 2004, p. 15
Finnair x AR 2004, p. 20
Finnlines x AR 2004, p. 47 & 50
Fiskars x AR 2004, p. 41
Fortum x AR 2004, p. 42
F-Secure x AR 2004 p.11 and firm´s web pages 24.11.05
HK Ruokatalo x AR 2004, p. 54
Honkarakenne x AR 2004, p. 20
Huhtamäki x AR 2004, p. 31
Ilkka-Yhtymä x AR 2004 p.13 and firm´s web pages 5.12.05
Incap x AR 2004, p. 41
Jaakko Pöyry Group x AR 2004, p. 5 and 31
Kasola x AR 2004, p. 4 
KCI Konecranes x AR 2004, p. 27
Kekkilä x AR 2004, p. 38
Kemira x AR 2004, p. 38
Keskisuomalainen x AR 2004, p. 40
Kesko x AR 2004, p. 61-62
Kesla x AR 2004, p. 24
Kylpyläkasino x -
Kyro x AR 2004, p. 51
Larox x AR 2004, p. 30
Lassila & Tikanoja x AR 2004, p. 48
Lemminkäinen x AR 2004, p. 62
Leo Longlife x AR 2004, p. 9
Lännen Tehtaat x AR 2004 p. 57 and firm´s web pages 12.12.05
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COMPANY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 REFERENCE
Marimekko x AR 2004, p. 20
Martela x AR 2004, p. 36
Metso x AR 2004, p. 50-51
M-real x Firm´s web pages 12.12.05
Nokia x AR 2004, p. 62
Nokian Renkaat x AR 2004, p. 76
Nordic Aluminium x Web annual report 2004, 15.12.05
Okmetic x AR 2004, p. 50-51
Olvi x Firm´s web pages 15.12.05
Orion x AR 2004, p. 64
Outokumpu x AR 2004, p. 117
Perlos x AR 2004, p. 40
PKC Group x AR 2004, p. 55
PMJ Automec (Cencorp) x Firm´s web pages 18.8.06
Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino x AR 2004, p. 46
Ponsse x AR 2004, p. 54
Proha x AR 2004, p. 5
QPR Software x Firm´s web pages 27.12.05
Raisio x AR 2004, p. 41
Rakentajain Konevuokraamo x AR 2004, p. 28
Ramirent x AR 2004, p. 19-20
Rapala VMC x Firm´s CG- statement in web 15.12.05
Rautaruukki x AR 2004, p. 39
Raute x AR 2004, p. 41
Rocla x AR 2004, p. 44-45
SanomaWSOY x AR 2004, p. 41
Satama Interactive x AR 2004, p. 34-35
Saunalahti Group x AR 2004, p. 39
Scanfil x Web annual report 2004, 29.12.05
Sentera x AR 2004, p. 24
Solteq x AR 2004, p. 28
SSH Communication Securities x AR 2004, p. 21-22
Stockmann x AR 2004, p. 31
Stonesoft x AR 2004, p. 11
Stora Enso x AR 2004, p. 32
Stromsdal x AR 2004, p. 38
Suomen Spar x AR 2004, p. 20
Suominen Yhtymä x AR 2004, p. 49
Sysopen x AR 2004, p. 16
Talentum x AR 2004 p. 6 and firm´s web pages 29.12.05
Tamfelt x AR 2004, p. 12
Tecnomen x AR 2004, p. 26
Tekla x AR 2004, p. 10 ja firm´s web pages 3.1.06
Teleste x AR 2004, p. 20
TietoEnator x AR 2004, p. 52-53
Tieto-X x AR 2004, p. 35
TJ- Group x AR 2004, p. 10 ja firm´s web pages 3.1.06
Tulikivi x AR 2004, p. 17
UPM-Kymmene x AR 2004, p. 106
Uponor x AR 2004, p. 60
Vacon x AR 2004, p. 26
Vaisala x AR 2004, p. 25
Wärtsilä x AR 2004, p. 34-35
YIT x AR 2004, p. 99
Yleiselektroniikka x -
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Table B3.  Board Independence reporting in financial year 2005 
 
 
COMPANY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 REFERENCE
Aldata Solution x AR 2005, p. 67
Amer Sports x AR 2005, p. 101
Aspo x AR 2005, p. 29
Aspocomp Group x AR 2005, p. 70
Atria x AR 2005, p. 7 and firm´s web pages 27.6.06
Basware x AR 2005, p. 19
Beltton x AR 2005, p. 38
Benefon x Firm´s web pages 30.6.06
Biohit x AR 2005, p. 23
Biotie Therapies x AR 2005, p. 18
Birka Line x AR 2005, p. 54
Cencorp (PMJ Automec) x Firm´s CG- statement in web, page 4.
Componenta x AR 2005, p. 12
Comptel x AR 2005, p. 64
Done Solutions x AR 2005, p. 54
E.ON Finland (Espoon Sähkö) x AR 2005, p. 60
Elcoteq x AR 2005, p. 75 and 79
Elecster x AR 2005, p. 5
Elektrobit x Firm´s web pages 30.6.06
Elisa x AR 2005, p. 70
Endero x AR 2005, p. 15
Etteplan x AR 2005, p. 50
Evia x AR 2005, p. 37
Evox Rifa Group x AR 2005, p. 18 and firm´s web pages 19.11.05
Exel x AR 2005, p. 20 and 69
Finnair x AR 2005, p. 65
Finnlines x AR 2005, p. 74
Fiskars x AR 2005, p. 64
Fortum x AR 2005, p. 50
F-Secure x AR 2005, p. 37
HK Ruokatalo x AR 2005, p. 70 and firm´s web pages 13.6.06
Honkarakenne x AR 2005, p. 17-18
Huhtamäki x AR 2005, p. 29
Ilkka-Yhtymä x AR 2005, p. 17 and firm´s web pages 5.12.05.
Incap x AR 2005, p. 59
Jaakko Pöyry Group x AR 2005, p. 39
Kasola x AR 2005, p. 6 and firm´s web pages 7.12.05.
KCI Konecranes x AR 2005, p. 28
Kekkilä x Firm´s CG- statement 2005, p. 2-3
Kemira x AR 2005, p. 40-41
Kemira GrowHow x AR 2005, p. 26
Keskisuomalainen x AR 2005, p. 63
Kesko x AR 2005, p. 42
Kesla x AR 2005, p. 21-22
Kylpyläkasino x Firm´s web pages 6.9.06
Kyro x AR 2005, p. 75 and 79
Larox x AR 2005, p. 72
Lassila & Tikanoja x AR 2005, p. 71
Lemminkäinen x AR 2005, p. 52
Leo Longlife x AR 2005, p. 8
Lännen Tehtaat x AR 2005, p. 94
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COMPANY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 REFERENCE
Marimekko x AR 2005, p. 27
Martela x AR 2005, p. 17
Metso x AR 2005, p. 62-63.
M-real x AR 2005, p. 88-89.
Nokia x AR 2005, p. 68
Nokian Renkaat x AR 2005, p. 41 and 45.
Nordic Aluminium x AR 2005, p. 2
Okmetic x AR 2005, p. 59
Olvi x Firm´s CG- statement in web, 15.12.06
Orion x AR 2005, p. 17
Outokumpu x AR 2005, p. 111
Perlos x AR 2005, p. 80
PKC Group x AR 2005, p. 74-75
Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino x AR 2005, p. 66
Ponsse x AR 2005, p. 96-97
Proha x AR 2005, p. 11-12
QPR Software x AR 2005, p. 6 and firm´s CG- statement in web, 27.12.05
Raisio x AR 2005, p. 54
Rakentajain Konevuokraamo x AR 2005, p. 49
Ramirent x AR 2005, p. 81-82
Rapala VMC x AR 2005, p. 56-57 and firm´s CG- statement in web, p. 3
Rautaruukki x AR 2005, p. 38
Raute x AR 2005, p. 71
Rocla x AR 2005, p. 68
SanomaWSOY x AR 2005, p. 72
Satama Interactive x AR 2005, p. 19
Scanfil x Web annual report 2005, 29.12.05
Sentera x AR 2005, p. 47
Solteq x AR 2005, p. 15 and firm´s web pages 29.12.05
SSH Communication Securities x AR 2005, p. 21-22
Stockmann x AR 2005, p. 10
Stonesoft x AR 2005, p. 9
Stora Enso x AR 2005 (Group), p. 30
Stromsdal x AR 2005, p. 22
Suomen Spar x AR 2005, p. 13
Suominen Yhtymä x AR 2005, p. 60
SysOpen Digia x AR 2005, p. 18
TJ- Group x AR 2005, p. 8 and firm´s web pages 14.1.07
Talentum x AR 2005 p. 30 and firm´s web pages 29.12.05
Tamfelt x AR 2005, p. 10
Tecnomen x AR 2005, p. 16
Tekla x AR 2005, p. 62
Teleste x AR 2005, p. 23
Tieto-X x AR 2005, p. 43
TietoEnator x AR 2005, p. 58-59
Tulikivi x AR 2005, p. 19
UPM-Kymmene x AR 2005, p. 118-119
Uponor x AR 2005, p. 53
Vacon x AR 2005, p. 24
Vaisala x AR 2005, p. 38
Wärtsilä x AR 2005, p. 37
YIT x AR 2005, p. 64-65
Yleiselektroniikka x AR 2005, p. 4
